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Author Anthony Pennington-Cross
A b s t r a c t This paper examines the expected price appreciation of distressed
property and compares it to the prevailing metropolitan area
appreciation rate. Whether due to individual property or local
area heterogeneity in appreciation, the results show that
foreclosed property appreciates less than the area average
appreciation rate. The magnitude of the deviation is sensitive to
loan characteristics, legal restrictions, housing market conditions
and marketing time.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
If the prices of homogeneous properties differ, arbitrage opportunities arise for
opportunistic home-buyers or home-sellers. In efficient markets, arbitrage
opportunities quickly dissipate and, thus, competition effectively eliminates price
deviations and reinforces the market-clearing price.
With the dissipation of arbitrage opportunities, the value of all identical property
should be the same, whether it is being sold by a homeowner or by a lender whose
has foreclosed on it. Unfortunately, the heterogeneity and thinness of housing
markets can make it difficult to identify the value of a house. Two methods of
estimating the value of property dominate both the academic and professional
spheres. The first, the hedonic method, relies on the ability to identify and value
all the attributes of a house and its location. Using each of these values, the
expected price of any home can be estimated. The second method, the repeat sales
method, relies on area-wide appreciation rates to update the last available
transaction price on the home and determine the expected value of the home.
In contrast to previous literature on the value of foreclosed property, this paper
uses the repeat sales approach to estimate the house price appreciation of property
where the second transaction used to calculate the appreciation rate is the sale of
foreclosed property. These appreciation rates, which will be referred to as
foreclosure appreciation rates, are used to determine if this unique pair of repeat
transactions (normal property, foreclosed property) appreciate in a systematically
different way than a typical pair of repeat transactions (normal property, normal
property).
This approach relies primarily on a publicly available repeat sales price index and
does not require detailed or timely information about the exact characteristics of
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the property or the location. This should make it much easier and less expensive
for lenders to estimate the loss from the sale of foreclosed property. Previous
literature has also been hmited because of the limited geographic coverage and
small sample sizes. In contrast, the sample used in this paper includes more than
12,000 sales of real estate owned (reo) property obtained through foreclosure
proceedings and covers all 50 states and the District of Columbia in the United
States.
The results indicate that the expected appreciation rates for foreclosed property,
which is defined as property that is for sale as real estate owned property in the
second of the two observed repeat transactions and normal or typical property in
the first of the two observed repeat transactions,' are lower than area appreciation
rates. Information on expected appreciation rates on distressed properties can be
used by lenders to help determine loss mitigation strategies.
This paper cannot test to see if foreclosure itself causes a decrease in price.
Instead, the results are interpreted as being consistent with individual property
deviation or location-specific deviation from the area-wide average appreciation
rate. The cause of this heterogeneity of appreciation rates may be due to changes
in neighborhood characteristics or changes in the characteristics of the property.
For example, the neighborhood could suffer from increased crime or a reduction
in school quality or the property could be flooded and not be fully repaired.
The remainder of the paper will review earlier estimates of the discount
foreclosures sell for, explore potential reasons for deviations in appreciation rates
from the mean for foreclosed property, and provide an empirical model to estimate
the extent of the deviations.
E s t i m a t e s o f t h e F o r e c l o s u r e D i s c o u n t
The foreclosure discount refers to the deviation between the expected price or
appreciation of typical or average property and the price or appreciation of the
foreclosed property. Prior efforts to estimate the discount at which a foreclosed
property sells have used very similar approaches—the hedonic model. Exhibit 1
shows that three of the four papers find that the selling price of a foreclosed
property is 22% to 24% lower. In contrast, consistent with the efficient market
theory, the most recent paper, by Carroll, Clauretie and Neill (1997), finds no
discount associated with selling a foreclosed property.
Despite these contradictory findings, the papers are very similar to each other in
terms of the method of analysis. For example, each estimates a hedonic model
expressed as:
Ln(P) = f{X,F).
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Where P is the price of the property, X is a vector of explanatory variables that
describe the property and its location, and F indicates if the property is sold as a
foreclosure. The estimated coefficient can then be interpreted as an indicator of
how much less or more the foreclosed property will sell for.
The first paper, by Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans (1990) provides the basic
approach, which the three other papers follow. They define the dependant variable
as the natural log of the condominium price on a set of explanatory variables
designed to describe the property and the location of the property. These
characteristics include items such as living area, location near a swimming pool,
vaulted ceilings, number of bedrooms, location in the condominium complex
(distance to mail room, trash and parking lot), and density. Because hedonic
models are sensitive to specification, the vector X should be comprehensive and
in the correct functional form. In addition, a unique model is required for each
location to identify the marginal contribution and value of each housing and
location attribute. Therefore, hedonic models become cumbersome and expensive
to maintain for any national lender who is trying to estimate expected sales prices
for distressed property.
The remaining papers follow the same approach, but study different property
types—condominiums, single family, muitifamily (apartment) and residential.
Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994) use the ZIP code number to control
for location.^ Carroll, Clauretie and Neill (1997) instead use ZIP code dummies
to control for location. When the ZIP code dummies are included, the foreclosure
indicator becomes insignificant for HUD foreclosures. These results emphasize
the need for unique models to determine the value of foreclosed property using
the hedonic methodology. For example, each city will require its own hedonic
model, because it makes little sense to impose the same marginal value of an
additional square foot of living space to an apartment in New York City, NY as
New Brunswick, NJ even though they are spatially close to each other.
The papers also only focus on one location at a time and suffer from very small
sample sizes. For example, Hardin and Wolverton (1996) have 9 observed
foreclosure sales and Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans (1990) do not report how
many of the 62 transactions were foreclosures.
An alternative approach is to use publicly available price indexes (see Freddie
Mac and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, OFHEO,
www.ofheo.gov, for publicly available repeat sales price indexes). Using a price
index, the value of any property could be updated to current values by simply
using the last available transaction or appraisal price. This would allow full
coverage of the U.S. using minimal resources. However, using the index by itself
without any adjustment for the impact of selling reo property or foreclosed
property may misstate the value of the property if it is true that foreclosed property
does sell at a discount. Therefore, it may be necessary to make an adjustment
to the expected appreciation rate. The following empirical section details how
to estimate and calculate any adjustment needed to the area-wide expected
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appreciation rate. In addition, the repeat sales method will automatically
incorporate any changing conditions of the location through time and there is no
need to collect detailed information about the property itself or the surrounding
location. This approach does assume that the property undergoes typical
maintenance and upgrades for foreclosed property. It does not assume that
foreclosed property has a typical maintenance history. In fact, any estimates of
the discounted appreciation rate will include the typical maintenance shortfall
associated with foreclosed properties in addition to any other factors unique to
foreclosures. In addition, similar to the hedonic approach, any deviations or
heterogeneity in appreciation rates within the defined location will not be captured.
W o u l d F o r e c l o s e d P r o p e r t y S e l l a t a D i s c o u n t ?
Just because a property was foreclosed is not enough to explain why it should
sell for less than comparable or nearby property. Surely, market participants are
savvy enough to identify under-priced property and make an arbitrage profit. This
is especially true for institutional sellers who must have good market knowledge
through years of selling distressed property.
One potential explanation for why foreclosed property would appreciate less than
its neighbors may simply be that the property has not captured area-wide
appreciation. In this view, house price appreciation rates are distributed around a
mean appreciation rate and foreclosures tend to be in the tail. This may be due
to neighborhood- or property-specific issues. For example, not all neighborhoods
appreciate at the same rate because the metropolitan area repeat sales index
represents only the average appreciation rate. Some neighborhoods within the
metropolitan area may experience rapid appreciation or depreciation due to
changes in the characteristics of the neighborhood or changes in preferences for
those characteristics. At the property level, events out of control of the homeowner
such as an unexpected and uninsured fiood or the discovery of a fuel tank in the
yard can impact the value of the property. In addition, not all owners will maintain
the property with the same vigilance. Therefore, heterogeneity of depreciation
rates is to be expected.
When the value of a house is less then the mortgage, then the borrower is in a
negative equity position. Ignoring transaction costs and a lender's right of
redemption, a ruthless defaulter will default exactly when the property enters a
negative equity position. Once other costs, bom by the borrower, of default are
factored into the decision, then it is necessary for the negative equity position to
be larger. While other events, typically referred to as trigger events (such as
employment and family structure shocks), can lead to missed payments, it makes
financial sense for borrowers to default, instead of prepaying the loan and
becoming a renter, if there exists a negative equity position. Therefore, it is likely
that many or most of the observed foreclosure sales are loans where the borrower
was in a negative equity position. Since homeowners can add more debt through
second mortgages or lines of credit, negative equity does not in itself imply lower
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house price appreciation rates. But, negative equity and price appreciation should
be negatively correlated.
In addition, owners who are at risk of defaulting may spend less on maintaining
the property. Supporting this theory, Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) find
evidence that borrowers with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios near one spend less on
maintenance than other homeowners. This will cause house prices on homes,
which have likely already deteriorated in value, to deteriorate even further.
Another argument for why foreclosed property may sell for less is that institutional
lenders/sellers are operating under a unique set of incentives that make them more
likely to accept below market prices on foreclosure sales. For example, regulatory
capital requirements are designed to provide incentives to remove nonperforming
assets from balance sheets. In addition, there is some evidence that owning real
estate purchased through foreclosures can have impacts on stock prices and credit
ratings (Downs, 1992; and Palmer, 1991). Also, each day that a non-performing
loan remains on the books the costs increase. For example, the property needs to
be maintained while it is vacant. The lender is also not receiving any income from
the loan and the loan is tying up funds that could be used to fund other performing
assets. To sell a property, the lender must also pay customary fees to an agent
who markets the property.
In an efficient thick market, however, the incentives of individual sellers and
buyers are irrelevant to the market clearing price. For a homogeneous product
with a large and deep market, a single price is available to all buyers and is easily
identified. As shown by the literature review, house prices can be thought of as
the sum of the value or price of all of its components (location description,
physical characteristics, number of bedrooms, etc.). Therefore, large and fairly
homogeneous new housing developments make it fairly straight forward to
estimate and establish the value of individual attributes and the house as a whole
because the market is both deep and thick.
As houses get older, it becomes more difficult to accurately ascertain the market
price because they become less homogeneous and it may become harder to
observe all the characteristics. For example, attributes of the house can change
through time or maintenance of the property can also vary by owner. For example,
if a homeowner is in a negative equity position (mortgage value>house value) it
may make little sense to incur additional expenses to maintain the property
because it will reduce the size of the negative equity and thus the value of the
option to default on the mortgage (Harding, Miceli and Sirmans, 2000).
In the housing market, the seller sets an asking price that is used as the starting
point for any further negotiation. Before a potential buyer makes a bid and decides
to enter negotiation, a physical inspection of the property is typically needed
(Arnold, 1999). This implies that it is very difficult to adequately describe the
attributes of a house and that homes with the same attributes (location, number
of baths, modern electricity, etc.), such as those used in a hedonic model, may
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differ in subtle and important ways that could only be determined after an actual
inspection of the property. In sum, it is difficult and costly to determine the
attributes associated with individual houses.
The uniqueness and thinness of the housing market leads to bargaining and
introduces the characteristics of the product and the characteristics of the seller
and buyer, as well as the bargaining skills of the participants in market transaction
prices (Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans 2003). For example, sellers with less
equity in the home typically may receive a higher than otherwise expected price.
One explanation of this is that homeowners need the equity in their current home
to provide a sufficient downpayment on their next purchase (typically a contingent
sale) (Genesove and Mayer, 1997). A host of other factors can affect the
bargaining position of the seller. For example, there is evidence that "out-of-
country,", "out-of-state," first time and in-migrate home buyers all pay premiums
(Tumbull and Sirmans, 1993; Watkins 1998; and McQueen and Slade, 2003).
G e t t i n g f r o m D e f a u l t t o F o r e c l o s u r e S a l e
It is a long road from a delinquent mortgage to the sale of foreclosed property
and there are many other options available to both the lender and borrower. This
paper examines the sale of property where the lender has become the owner. This
type of property is typically referred to as real estate owned or reo property. A
lender can become the owner of a property at any stage during delinquency and
foreclosure proceedings. The lender may become the owner of the property
through agreement with the homeowner or through forceful eviction. The lender
may even purchase the property at an auction or through other public proceedings;
however, the purchase of foreclosed property by a lender is not the topic studied
in this paper. Instead, this paper examines the sale of reo property and how the
appreciation of this property confounds area-wide appreciation rates.
Before a property becomes reo, the lender and homeowner have many other
options available to them. For example, the lender can encourage the owners of
a home with a delinquent mortgage to sell the home to avoid foreclosure
proceedings and the stigma of foreclosure on their credit report. These pre-
foreclosure sales are also referred to as short sales if the selling price of the home
is less than the outstanding debt and late fees owed the lender. Often, the lender
will agree not to collect the remaining balance in a pre-foreclosure sale. This
could be in the best interest of the lender because the costs and time delays of
foreclosure are avoided. Indeed, a pre-foreclosure sale is conducted by the owner
of the property and therefore looks at least on the surface very similar to a typical
sale. Depending on the agreement with the lender, the seller-owner may have
incentives to sell the home quickly or slowly. For example, the lender may set a
time limit on how long it is willing to wait for the sale to be completed. Or the
lender may limit how much of a loss it is willing to absorb. These incentives could
lead to higher or lower listings, times on the market and transaction prices than
typical.
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Another option for the lender and borrower is for the borrower to hand over the
deed to the property in lieu of foreclosure. Again, the lender avoids going through
the foreclosure process, but any liens attached to the title will become the
responsibility of the lender. As with a pre-foreclosure sale, the lender typically
forgoes the ability to collect on any unpaid principal, interest, taxes, or fees in
exchange for the deed. The property is then considered reo and the lender will
sell the property in the open market. Once the property becomes reo, the lender
must market the property and enter into negotiations with any potential buyers.
Another option available to the lender is to proceed through foreclosure and collect
the proceeds from the sale of the property or purchase the property itself. The
sale of foreclosed property is conducted under two broad legal regimes: the
judicial foreclosure process or the power-of-sale or non-judicial foreclosure
process. Put simply, judicial foreclosures involve the state court system; in non-
judicial states, the lender has the power to evict the defaulted borrower and sell
the property on its own. Large power-of-sale states include California, Texas and
Michigan. In general, foreclosures in judicial states take much longer than non-
judicial foreclosures. However, even within judicial states, the method by which
the property is sold varies widely from county to county. For example, the property
could be sold at a public auction at an advertised place and location. The property
could be also auctioned at "Sheriff Sales," which will typically occur once a
month. Other alternatives, which may not be auctions, include attorney sale, court
appointed referee sale, or even sale at the court house or at the property itself.
There are also a variety of ways that foreclosed property sold in non-judicial
foreclosure states are influenced by local legal and customary practices. But
typical power-of-sale foreclosure sales include auction sales or trustee sales after
an advertising period.
In both regimes (power-of-sale or judicial), the lender has the opportunity to
purchase the property with no additional cash outlay at the foreclosure sale. If the
lender does this, then the property is considered reo property—the property is
now owned by the lender instead of the borrowers. A lender might purchase the
property if it believes the auction price is substantially below market value or
when the defaulted amount plus other fees (lender total investment) is less than
the highest available purchase price. For example, imagine an auction with only
one other party and the party offers $100 for the property. If the lender decides
not to bid $101 even though the property value is much higher in some states,
the defaulted borrower will have the statutory right to then redeem the property
for $101 plus late fees, thus regaining ownership. This is one reason why only
sensible offers tend to win the auction or bidding and the winning offer should
be above the lender's total investment or a sensible redemption value.
Assuming no acceptable bids are put forth, the lender can choose to "win" the
auction and purchase the property.^ If the lender wins the auction, the property
becomes reo property. It is the sale of reo property, whether purchased through a
foreclosure sale, a deed in lieu agreement or any other form, that the empirical
analysis uses to estimate the foreclosure discount.
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E m p i r i c a l Test
The objective of this section is to estimate the magnitude of the foreclosure
discount, measured through relative expected appreciation rates, as well as any
additional impact caused by the weaker bargaining position of the lender when
selling the property. Only the sale of reo property is considered.
Earlier two arguments were presented as to why foreclosed property will
appreciate less than the area average a rate. First, foreclosure sales are by
definition loans that have defaulted and are therefore likely to have experienced a
relative reduction in price. In essence, this argument is simply that the property
was unlucky and had a negative shock to its price or that households that default
on a loan do not do typical maintenance and therefore the price is lower. Second,
when a lender owns property (reo), it is in a weak bargaining position and as a
result is willing to accept a lower price to dispose of the property quickly.
The empirical test is set up as:
where A is the foreclosure discount defined as the difference between the
appreciation rate for the metropolitan area as a whole and the appreciation rate
for the house being sold; (f> is the discount associated with foreclosures; )3 is the
discount associated with bargaining power during the marketing of the property;
and i// are other factors that could impact the value of the property.
To examine the contributing factors to the foreclosure discount, a stratified random
sample of over 12,000 reo sales is used. The sales are taken from metropolitan
areas where the repeat sales index was available from two large secondary market
institutions. The institutions primarily are involved in the prime market. To help
protect the proprietary nature of the data and the identity of the institutions, the
sample rates cannot be revealed. In addition, high cost loans, which are defined
as loans with interest rates at least 100 basis points above the prevailing prime
rate as defined by the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS)
are over-sampled to insure their representation in the data set. The intent is to
provide enough observations of these higher cost and presumably higher risk loans
to identify any additional discount. The data include only single-family 30-year
fixed-rate mortgages originated from 1995 through 1999. The loan outcome is
also only observed until the end of 1999, thus creating a truncated sample of
defaulted loans. To aid interpretation of the results, all continuous variables are
mean deleted (the mean equals zero) during estimation.
Exhibit 2 provides the geographic distribution of the loans. It shows that, as
expected, California, Florida and Texas are the states with the largest number of
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Exhibit 2 | Geographic Distribution of Loans
State
AK
AL
AR
KL
CA
CO
a
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
lA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
Ml
MN
MO
MS
Number of
Loans
1
156
29
340
2530
93
70
108
13
2622
483
45
57
30
470
173
48
31
89
86
291
4
211
107
195
25
Percentage
of All Loans
0.01
1.27
0.24
2.77
20.60
0.76
0.57
0.88
0.11
21.35
3.93
0.37
0.46
0.24
3.83
1.41
0.39
0.25
0.72
0.70
2.37
0.03
1.72
0.87
1.59
0.20
State
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
Wl
WV
WY
—
Number of
Loans
6
170
4
10
10
195
64
270
280
258
68
75
235
21
131
10
106
1405
80
289
4
210
53
9
10
Percentage of
All Loans
0.05
1.38
0.03
0.08
0.08
1.59
0.52
2.20
2.28
2.10
0.55
0.61
1.91
0.17
1.07
0.08
0.86
11.44
0.65
2.35
0.03
1.71
0.43
0.07
0.08
loans. In fact, together these three states account for approximately 53% of all
reo sales in the sample. In contrast, Alaska has only one sale.
Exhibit 3 describes each of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The first
two variables are used to define the dependant variable, the foreclosure discount
(zi). The percentage house price growth of the reo sold property is denoted by
i^,, where / indexes the property; s the time period in which the loan was
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Exhibit 3 I Description of Variables
Variable Source Description
Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO, www.ofheo.gov)
Loan level data
Loan level data & OFHEO
Loan level data
pre-reo,, Loan level data
Judicial,
SRR,
Pence (2003)
Pence (2003)
The percentage change in metropolitan area
house prices from the date of origination to
the date the foreclosed property is sold. The
percentage change is expressed as a fraction
so that a 95% change is reported as 0.95.
This variable is used with %Ahp;^, to calculate
the foreclosure discount.
The percentage change in the selling price of
the property from the date of origination to
the date of sale. The percentage change is
expressed as a fraction so that a 95% change
is reported as 0.95.
The difference between the metropolitan area
appreciation rate and the specific property
appreciation rate from the date of origination
through sale of the property. This difference,
or the foreclosure discount, can be
interpreted as percentage point differences
expressed as fractions. Therefore, if the
foreclosure discount is reported as 0.05, then
the foreclosed property appreciated 5
percentage points less than the metropolitan
area as a whole.
The number of months that the property has
been owned by the lender/investor or been
reo (real estate owned). This time period
occurs after the loan has been delinquent and
defaulted on. The lender typically takes
physical possession of the property at the
beginning of the reo time period. The lender
also typically conducts maintenance to
prepare the property for sale and markets the
property for sale.
The age of the loan in months when the
default is complete and the property enters
reo. The complete timeline for the property is
therefore represented by the variables pre-reo
and reo. The sum of pre-reo and reo will
equal the total number of months from
origination to sale of the foreclosed property.
The loan exists in a state with a judicial
foreclosure process.
The loan exists in a state where the borrower
has the statutory right of redemption.
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Exhibit 3 | (continuedl
Description of Variables
Variable
nonDJj
sato.
loon omounfi
Source
Pence (2003)
Loan level data
Freddie Mac's Primary
Mortgage Market Survey
(PMMS)
Loan level data
Description
The loan exists in a state where the lender
does not have the right to declare a
deficiency judgment against the borrower.
The LTV ratio of the loan at origination,
expressed as a fraction.
The spread at origination between the
contract interest rate and the market interest
rate on the loan divided by 10.
Loan amount is the dollar amount expressed
in 100,000's thot was borrowed.
originated (the first transaction); and t the time period in which the distressed
property is sold. All percentages are expressed as a decimal (5% = 0.05). The
%Ahpi^^, is the percentage change in metropolitan area house prices from the
origination date of the loan through the sale as measured by the metropolitan area
OFHEO repeat sale house price index;'* m indexes the location of the house in a
metropolitan area. The difference between these two price appreciation variables
(A = %Ahpi^^, - %AhpiJ is the discount associated with being a foreclosed
property. For instance, if prices for the foreclosed property went up 10% and
metropolitan area prices went up 15% for the same time period, then the discount
was 5% or 0.05. Note that the average discount, as reported in Exhibit 4, was
22% or, as shown in the descriptive statistics, 0.22. This should be interpreted as
the discount over the whole life of the loan or cumulative appreciation discount,
not the discount on the transaction price.
To help identify the marginal impact of the lender's bargaining position or
marketing position, the timeline of the property can be separated into two time
periods: (1) the time period before the lender gains ownership of the property and
(2) the time period when the lender becomes the owner and markets the property
for sale. The first time period will represent the natural discount associated solely
with being a foreclosure sale. The variable pre-reo,, is the number of months that
a loan exists prior to the property entering reo. Therefore, it will capture the
baseline foreclosure discount as the loan ages (< )^. The second time period
represents any additional deviation or discount associated with the marketing and
bargaining time period. The variable reo,, indicates the number of months that the
loan has been in the reo state (the time period when the property is owned by the
lender/investor) until it is sold. As a result, it will represent the marginal impact
of the lender's reo holding period on price appreciation (j3), holding all other
factors constant. The expected impact for this variable is positive (a larger
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Exhibit 4 | Summary Statistics
Variable
reo.,, £ 2
2 < reo,i < 4
4 < reo,, s 6
6 < reOi, < 8
8 < reo^, < 10
10 < reoi,£ 12
reo^, > 12
pre-reo,.
Judidol,
SRR,
nonDJ,
loan amount,
{loan
Mean Std Dev Minimum
0.22
5.90
0.15
0.26
0.24
0.15
0.09
0.05
0.06
27.86
890.16
0.10
0.05
0.42
0.06
0.27
0.93
0.06
0.97
1.12
0.19
3.57
0.35
0.44
0.43
0.36
0.29
0.22
0.23
10.68
631.17
0.06
0.21
0.49
0.23
0.44
0.05
0.05
0.44
0.97
-1.29
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
16
-0.17
0
0
0
0
0.36
-0.42
0.16
0.03
Maximum
1.24
30
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
57
3249
0.44
1
1
1
1
1
0.35
3.05
9.28
Notes: The number of observations is 12,280. In the estimation, pre-reo is divided by 100 and all
continuous variables are mean deleted (actual value-mean value), so that the mean value during
estimation is zero. %Ahpi is the fractional change in house prices from the origination date of the
loan through the date of sale as measured by the OFHEO repeat sale house price index (hpi);
%Ahp is the fractional change in the value of the house from loan origination through sale date;
%Ahpi < / is a dummy variable indicating that the metropolitan area price index has decreased;
reo is the number of the months the property was real estate owned until sale; pre-reo is the age
of the loan in months when it became owned by the investor or entered reo; Judicial indicates that
the loan exists in a state with a judicial foreclosure process; SRR indicates that the loan exists in a
state where the borrower has the statutory right of redemption; nonDJ indicates that the loon exists
in a state where the lender does not hove the right to declare a deficiency judgment against the
borrower; Itv is the LTV ratio of the loan at origination; and sato is the spread at origination
between the contract interest rate and the market interest rate on the loan divided by 10 and the
loan amount expressed in 100,000's of dollars.
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discount), because the longer the distressed property sits on the balance sheet, the
larger losses become and the more the firm can be disciplined by the market
through regulatory demands or stock price declines. This discount may also reflect
the difficulty that the lender has in marketing the property due to maintenance or
other considerations.
Exhibit 4 indicates that the average loan spends 5.9 months in reo and 27.9 months
before entering reo. The 27.9 months will include time when the loan is current
and delinquent, as well as time during the foreclosure proceedings. Note that the
maximum time that any loan is observed is slightly less than 5 years, which
truncates the sample so that the observed defaults are primarily defaults that occur
early in a loan's life. There is a wide variation in the number of months a loan
exists prior to entering reo or in reo, as well as the magnitude of the foreclosure
discount. To capture the impact of other factors, which may differentially affect
foreclosed property, other factors are also included (ip). These factors include
measures of state level foreclosure laws, risk characteristics of the loan and local
housing market conditions.
S p e c i f i c a t i o n
The foreclosure discount (zl = %Ahpi^,, - %AhpiJ may be functionally related
to the arguments in Equation 2:
+ a'JB) + a'(ih) +
Each symbol represents a vector of potential explanatory variables. For instance,
the discount may be directly related to the time spent before entering reo (</>), the
time spent in reo (j8) and other factors (i//). £,„ is an independently normally
distributed error term with a constant variance that includes all other determinants
of A not classified elsewhere. Estimates of the parameters a^, a^ and a^ provide
measures of how changes in the associated variables affect the relative appreciation
rate of foreclosed property.
In the estimation, all continuous variables are mean deleted. This is to aid
interpretation of the piece-wise linear estimation of the impact of time spent in
reo, which proxies for the impact of the marketing and bargaining period (reo).
The time spent in reo is disaggregated into 7 cohorts. No constant is reported so
that the estimated coefficient for each reo time length cohort can be directly
interpreted as the average discount associated with that cohort. For example, when
2 < reo,, :^ 4 equals 1, this implies that a loan spends more than 2 months and
up to 4 months in the reo. Otherwise 2 < reo^, < 4 equals 0. The summary
statistics show that the majority of loans spend less than 6 months in reo, while
approximately 6% of the loans spend over a year in reo.
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To capture the impact of a loan aging, as opposed to the time spent marketing
the property, the number of months that a loan exists prior to entering reo (pre-
reOi,) is also included. To allow for any non-linear impacts, the square of pre-reo^,
is also included. This could be thought of as representing the baseline foreclosure
discount.
Beyond the timeline associated with a loan, other factors (i//) may also reduce or
exaggerate any difference in appreciation rates between foreclosed property and
the area-wide appreciation rate. These factors are grouped into housing (H), legal
(L) and other mortgage (M) impacts.
Housing market conditions may make it more or less difficult to dispose of
distressed property. To proxy for housing market conditions, house price increases
for the area as a whole are used (H). If local house prices increase, it is expected
that foreclosed properties will also experience an increase in prices, but not
necessarily of exactly the same amount as the area-wide increase. If )8^ > 0,
foreclosed property price appreciation rates receive an additional discount when
house prices increase in general. The metropolitan area OFHEO repeat sales house
price index is used to proxy for local area "average" or "market" house price
appreciation rates (%Ahpi^j. In addition, a dummy variable is included indicating
when prices for the area as a whole have declined {%Ahpi^,^, < 0). This may help
to indicate whether the discount is larger or smaller in weak housing markets.^
Three variables are used to capture legal distinctions (L) between jurisdictions and
types of foreclosure. There is some evidence that local laws (state and county)
can be capitalized into house prices (Pence, 2003; and Miceii, Munneke, Sirmans
and Tumbull, 2002). This paper measures the impact of various state level legal
requirements on the relative appreciation rate of foreclosed property to the area-
wide appreciation rate. Since these indicators will help determine the costs of
terminating loans in default, they may be more directly capitalized into the value
of distressed property than for normal property. Judicial^ indicates that the loan
exists in a state with a judicial foreclosure process. 5/?/?, indicates that the loan
exists in a state where the borrower has the statutory right of redemption. nonDJ^
indicates that the loan exists in a state where the lender does not have the right
to declare a deficiency judgment against the borrower.
Other mortgage-related explanatory variables (M) may also impact the discount.
If the characteristics of the borrower and the lender's identification of the risk
characteristics of the borrower are related to or correlated with the propensity of
the homeowner to maintain the property or the lender's bargaining power, then
property appreciation rates will also be affected. To test for this effect, the spread
at origination between the contract rate of the mortgage and the prevailing rate
for prime fixed-rate mortgages {sato^ is included. The prevailing rate is the interest
rate reported by Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) in the
relevant month. An individual unable to initially obtain a low rate mortgage may
possess a lower propensity to behave responsibly with respect to other obligations,
including a willingness to maintain the property values.'' Ltv^ is the loan-to-value
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ratio of the loan at origination and is included to test for any systematic relation
between equity at origination (a risk proxy) and the relative appreciation rate.
Loans with very high LTVs or little or no equity at origination will require a
smaller decrease in house value to enter negative equity but once in negative
equity, there is little incentive to maintain the property. Therefore, itVj may
exaggerate or depress the foreclosure discount. The loan amount^ expressed in
100,0^Q0's of dollars and the loan amount^ complete the list of variables contained
in the data set that also appear in Equation 3.
L e g a l I s s u e s a n d D e f i n i t i o n s
There is substantial variation across the country in how states treat the rights of
the borrowers and lenders during the foreclosure process. Capone (1996) and
Pence (2003) provide a comprehensive summary of the variations in foreclosure
state laws. Following Pence's definitions, three foreclosure classifications are used
in this paper: (1) 21 states require a judicial foreclosure process so that the lender
must proceed through the court, while all other states allow a non-judicial
procedure called power-of-sale, which is typically simpler, cheaper and quicker;
{2) 9 states allow a statutory right of redemption so that up to a year after sale of
the property the homeowner can redeem the property by paying the foreclosure
price plus any foreclosure expenses; and (3) 9 states do not allow a deficiency
judgment to be used by the lender to collect any losses on a foreclosure from the
borrower's other assets.
Previous research has focused on the relationship between how much of the
outstanding balance on a loan is recovered and state foreclosure loans. For
example. Wood (1997) finds evidence that Fannie Mae recovery rates are higher
in right of redemption states and lower in deficiency judgment states, potentially
a counter-intuitive result. Overall, the econometric evidence of the relationship
between foreclosure laws and recovery on sales is mixed (e.g., Clauretie, 1989;
Clauretie and Herzog, 1990; Crawford and Rosenblatt, 1995; and Ciochetti, 1997).
E m p i r i c a l R e s u l t s
Ordinary least squares is used to estimate a model of the difference between
metropolitan area appreciation rates and the specific appreciation rate of the reo
property from origination through sale by the lender. This is referred to as the
foreclosure discount when positive and the foreclosure premium when negative.
In general, the results show that foreclosed property tends to appreciate less than
the area appreciation rate. While the previous literature focused on the level of
house prices by estimating hedonic models, the results in this paper do support
the findings of Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans (1990), Forgey, Rutherford and
VanBuskirk (1994) and Hardin and Wolverton (1996), who found that foreclosed
property sells for less than other property, but do not support Carroll, Clauretie
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and Niell (1997), who found that foreclosed property sells for the same price as
other property.
Specification I provides an estimate of the baseline discounts associated with the
age of the loan until reo and the time spent in reo prior to sale of the property.
Exhibit 5 shows that this baseline information captures almost 59% of the variation
Exhibit 5 | Ordinary Least Squares Results
Variable
reo,, s 2
2 <reo,, <
4 < reo,, •-
6 < reo,,:
8 < reo,,:
10 < reo,,
reo,,> 12
pre-reo,.
pre-reo/
%Ahpi,^^ <
Judicial,
SRR,
nonDJ,
Itv,
soto.
Specification 1 Specification
Coeff, ^Stat, Coeff,
0,15 12,74 0,15
4 0,14 11,84 0,14
£ 6 0,15 12,84 0,16
s 8 0,18 15,51 0,19
s 10 0,20 16,06 0,20
< 12 0,22 16,74 0,22
0,25 18,59 0,24
-0,26 -3,50 -0,34
0,57 4,60 0,56
0,17
: 0 0,03
0,03
0,02
-0,06
loon amount.
[loan amo
Adj, R2
jnfJ2
0,587 0,603
1
f-Stat,
12,43
12,09
13,01
15,37
15,63
16,05
17,44
-4,63
4,56
5,03
2,93
7,45
2,93
-13,59
Specification
Coeff,
0,16
0,15
0,16
0,19
0,21
0,23
0,25
-0,26
0,39
0,14
0,03
0,03
0,01
-0,03
-0,23
0,36
-0,36
0,12
0,640
III
^Stat,
13,61
13,35
14,35
16,77
17,10
17,72
19,05
-3,66
3,30
4,35
3,51
7,32
1,55
-6,56
-7,97
11,02
-22,58
16,85
Notes; The dependent variable (%Ahpi - %Ahp) is defined as the difference between percentage
change in the value of the house prices in the location and the percentage change in the
foreclosed property from loan origination through sale, expressed in fractions. This can be
interpreted as the discount associated with foreclosed property. All continuous variables are mean
deleted (actual value-mean value), so that the mean value during estimation is zero. Tests to see if
extreme values in the dependant variable could be impacting results showed the results to be
robust. For example, if the top and bottom deciles are removed from the data, thus reducing the
sample to 12,034 and the range of the dependent variable to -0,139 to 0,779, there is little or
no impact on the results. The adjusted /?^  did increase to 0,679 and the SRR, became insignificant
at all levels. All other coefficients changes were not material.
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in the foreclosure discount. Since all continuous variables are mean deleted, the
expected discount can be read directly from the reo dummy variables. For
example, using Specification I, if a loan is the average loan in all aspects accept
that it spends only one month in reo, the expected discount is 15% (as reported
by the coefficient 0.15 beeause the dependent variable is expressed in fractions).
The discount drops to 14% for a reo time period of two to four months and then
steadily rises to 25% for loans that spend a year or more in reo before being sold.
By subtracting the coefficient estimate through time, the results provide estimates
of the marginal impact of the loan spending more time in reo. For example, the
discount increases by 3 percentage points (0.22 - 0.25) when the time in reo
increases from 12 to 13 months. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
lenders who are selling distressed property are in a weak bargaining and marketing
position leading to lower than average appreciation rates. Therefore, as the
property spends more time in reo, losses are increasing and the pressure to
liquidate the property is mounting. In addition, the time spent may indicate
difficulty in fixing any maintenance problems associated with the property, thus
leading to lower than average appreciation.^
The next set of variables establishes the baseline foreclosure discount. This is the
time period before the property enters reo (pre-reoi,). In this time period, the
borrower still owns the property even though it may have been many months since
any payment has been made on the loan. Therefore, this time period has no
relation to the ability of the lender to market the property and the lender's
bargaining position. Instead, it refiects the typical or baseline discount associated
with a foreclosure on independent of the reo time period. The quadratic
specification indicates a U-shaped baseline.
The smallest discount is when pre-reo^, is just over 50 months. Therefore, loans
that enter reo early in their lives have higher foreclosure discounts. For example,
using Specification I, if the property spends 9 months in reo and pre-reo equals
12 months then the discount is 25.6%, but by the time pre-reo equals 50 months,
the discount has reduced to 17%.
Since the longest time that loans are observed is for a pre-reo of 57 months, and
most observations have observed pre-reo's below 50, these results primarily show
that the discount tends to decrease, although at a declining rate as the pre-reo time
period extends. In addition, these truncation issues make the results only relevant
for relatively short lived loans and may not apply to longer lived loans.
Specifications II and III introduce other factors that could affect the foreclosure
discount. The introduction of housing market conditions and legal restrictions
increases the adjusted R^ to .603. Lastly, the introduction of other mortgage related
factors in Specification III increases the adjusted R^ to .640.
Focusing on Specification III, the appreciation of reo sales captures 86% of
metropolitan area-wide appreciation (1 - P%Ah,M-)- Also, note that in locations
where overall prices have decreased, the discount is slightly larger. The impacts
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of the foreclosure laws mostly conform to prior expectations. The discount for
selling foreclosed property is 3 percentage points higher when the foreclosure
must use the judicial process. This is expected because the judicial process should
include more administrative costs to interact with the court system. In contrast,
the fact that a loan is in a state where the borrower has a statutory right to redeem
the property has no additional impact on the discount. Lenders often delay the
sale of reo property until the right of redemption period has passed, because it is
difficult to sell without a "clean" title, but this impact is already measures by
reOj,. States that do not allow deficiency judgments against defaulted borrowers
experience discounts 3 percentage points lower. In addition, the borrower in
default will benefit by continuing to maintain the property even in a negative
equity, because they may still be liable for any losses suffered by the lender after
sale of the property.
The introduction of loan information in Specification III again provides a series
of compelling results. For example, loans with higher LTVs have lower discounts.
This is consistent with the theory that borrowers with little equity require smaller
declines in house values to trigger a default. The spread between the contract rate
on the mortgage and the market rate at origination (sato^) is also systematically
associated with the discount of foreclosed properties. For example, if a home buyer
is paying a rate of 10% when the prevailing market rate is 8%, then the discount
on a foreclosed property would be 0.72% higher. This result may proxy for the
behavior of the borrower during delinquency and default prior to eviction. Lastly,
larger loans also have lower discounts until the loan amount reaches approximately
$150,000. After this point, the discount increases. This may refiect the higher
transaction costs associated with selling a lower priced home.
C o n c l u s i o n
Using metropolitan area repeat sales price indexes, this research finds evidence
that foreclosed property appreciates more slowly than the area average
appreciation rates. The proposed method is simple, is easy to replicate, and uses
information available to any lender. Unlike the hedonic models, this approach does
not require detailed information about the property itself, its neighbors, or the
characteristics of the location, and can be used by lenders and investors to estimate
the expected sale price of property if the borrower becomes delinquent.
While the results do not indicate that the foreclosure itself causes the price
appreciation deviation, they are consistent with the notion that foreclosure
proxies for other neighborhood- or property-specific characteristics, such as a
neighborhood in decline.
In addition, this paper extends the literature by examining the pricing pattems of
foreclosed property over the entire United States and includes a sample of over
12,000 sales of reo property. The empirical results find that foreclosed property
appreciates on average 22% less than the area average appreciation rate. However,
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the magnitude of the difference or the foreclosure discount is sensitive to housing
conditions, legal constraints and loan characteristics. In addition, the longer a
lender owns a piece of property (real estate owned property) after default, the
larger the foreclosure discount (actual minus area-wide appreciation). This result
is consistent with the theory that the ability to market the property, as well as
seller characteristics, can impact expected prices and, as a result, expected
appreciation rates.
While this paper provides a new method of estimating the extent that foreclosed
property prices are expected to deviate from area averages, one potential avenue
of future research could focus on the probability of foreclosure using the
characteristics of the property, location, borrower and mortgage to help account
for potential selection bias.
End notes
' An alternative approach not used in this paper would be to examine the sale of repeat
observations where the first transaction is the sale of foreclosed or reo property and the
second transaction is the sale of typical or normal property.
^ The authors indicate that future specification tests including ZIP code fixed effects did
not materially affect the results.
^ The borrower can also declare bankruptcy anytime during or before the foreclosure
process. The foreclosure is stayed (cancelled or at least postponed) until lifted by the
bankruptcy court. The investor or lender can then file a motion for relief, which is
typically granted if the outstanding mortgage is larger then the value of the house
(negative equity) (Nemeth and Van Horn, 1994).
"* Note that the area-wide appreciation rate used is the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) metropolitan area repeat sales house price index. This price index
includes all whole loan purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F). Therefore, it
includes both home purchases and refinances, as well as some foreclosed property. Given
F&Fs lending standards and the very low rate of F&F foreclosure, foreclosed property
must be a very small fraction of the total volume of transactions. But if the existence of
foreclosure and other distressed property sales does bias the OFHEO price index, it
should drive the results toward finding no deviations between foreclosed sale price
appreciation and the OFHEO price index appreciation.
^ Note that various specifications were tested. For example, a spline function (a negative
price appreciation dummy interacted with the appreciation) was tested to allow more
functional form fiexibility, but was statistically insignificant.
*" Note that loans with interest rates 100 basis points or more above the prevailing prime
rate are over-sampled. In the estimation, weighted and unweighted ordinal least squares
were tested and the specification was found to be robust.
' An alternative specification could include an intercept and dummy variables for the
remaining categories. When reoit < 2 is the excluded category in Specification III, all
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categories are significant expect 4< reoit < 6. In other words, the marginal impact of
increased time in reo is statistically significant.
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